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1. Overview 
North Africa1 is highly vulnerable to the consequences of climate change because of its strong 
exposure to increases in temperature, changes in freshwater availability, and population growth. 
The production of agricultural goods is sensitive to changing climate conditions across northern 
Africa, as economies strongly depend on agriculture or livestock. Due to the already existing 
water scarcity and this strong dependence on rain-fed agriculture, there is additional vulnerability, 
further exacerbated by an adaptive capacity that is limited by poverty and political instability. The 
impacts of climate change in North Africa are complex and not fully understood, they also interact 
and amplify other drivers and socio-economic factors, making attribution difficult to detangle. 
However, in general, climate change is expected to have important impacts on drought, water 
supplies and food security, which may impact on the stability, prosperity and security of the 
region. However, research in this emerging field has not yet succeeded in establishing a 
consensus on primary causes, mechanisms, links, and interventions between climate change 
and insecurity (Gemenne et al. 2014).  
Other findings include:  
• In North Africa, human-induced climate change is projected to increase temperatures 
over the 21st century, with the strongest warming projected to take place close to the 
Mediterranean coast and in inland Algeria, Libya and Egypt. An increase in the number of 
heat wave days is also projected. Precipitation projections are more uncertain, but a 
reduction in precipitation is likely over Northern Africa by the end of the 21st century.  
• The concept of desertification is vague, making attribution of climate change impacts 
relative to other drivers difficult. Some argue that the term has been politicised and is no 
longer of analytical use, as drylands exist in a state of non-equilibrium and uncertainty. 
No study has attributed recent climate change as the single driver of desertification. 
• North African countries (notably Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) are projected to become 
global hotspots for drought by the end of the 21st century. Drought can have both direct 
and indirect impacts in North Africa, and can act as a risk multiplier, destabilising 
populations, amplifying inequalities in access to water services and water resources, and 
reinforcing perceptions of marginalisation (World Bank, 2017). 
• Freshwater scarcity ranks highest amongst the challenges facing North Africa, given its 
impact on food security, economic development and poverty reduction, and socio-political 
stability (Lezzaik & Milewski, 2017). Natural water scarcity, as a function of the 
predominantly (hyper-)arid environment of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region, is exacerbated by climate change (on both quantity and quality) but more 
importantly by increased water demand consistent with population growth, urbanisation, 
and economic growth. 
• For North Africa, it is estimated that in 2050 climate change will account for 22% of future 
water shortages in the region while 78% of increased future water shortages can be 
                                                 
1 Please note that assessments of climate change – such as those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change – consider regional climate changes with different groupings, some look at only North Africa (consisting 
of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia), whereas others take the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region as a whole. This review refers to both these groupings, and this has been indicated where appropriate.  
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attributed to socioeconomic factors (Droogers et al, 2012 cited in Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2014b: 1217). 
• The MENA region strongly depends on food and associated virtual water imports (water 
embedded in agricultural commodities); it is projected that this dependency will increase. 
Import dependency results in a high vulnerability to fluctuating global food prices, which 
to some extent are also driven by climate impacts in food-exporting regions. On the other 
hand, food imports reduce the region’s direct vulnerability to local climate risks. 
• Although climate change will act as a risk multiplier for food insecurity in MENA 
(particularly around issues of water security, the rapid expansion of informal urban areas, 
and conflict and instability), the main drivers of food insecurity to 2030 will be population 
growth, urbanisation, and economic changes. 
• Jobbins and Henley (2015) emphasise that most people in MENA will be affected by 
climate impacts on their income and health, livelihoods, food price volatility, and the 
potential for climate extremes such as floods and storms to disrupt food supply chains.  
• The region is expected to have the greatest economic losses from climate related water 
scarcity as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2050 (World Bank 2016). 
• The poorest and socially marginalised segments of the population are the most 
vulnerable to climate variability and extremes, particularly in developing countries. 
• African women are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change because they 
shoulder an enormous but imprecisely recorded portion of responsibility for subsistence 
agriculture. They are vulnerable to climate change, both in terms of lacking opportunities 
to fulfil their adaptive capacity and by being more reliant on natural resources that are 
likely to be affected by climate change. 
• There is an ongoing debate on the links between climate variability and conflict; there are 
a number of contrasting opinions and empirical findings are inconclusive.  
• The literature has found that the relationship between climate change and human 
security is not causal; the connection between climate change impacts and conflict 
outcomes is highly place and time-specific, and is the product of many different, 
intersecting factors. Hence, climate change is not the only important parameter of future 
violence and security considerations. Other factors such as human development, 
effective institutions, and governance also affect the likelihood of violent conflict. 
• Climate change might act as a ‘threat multiplier’ for the security situation in the MENA 
region by placing additional pressure on already scarce resources and reinforcing pre-
existing threats as political instability, poverty, and unemployment. However, this 
dominant ‘threat multiplier’ framing has been challenged by some academics who 
question the narrative’s unidirectional flow from climate vulnerability to conflict.  
A number of gaps were identified in the literature and these are discussed in the final section of 
this literature review.  
2. Climate change in North Africa 
Temperature projections 
Africa as a whole is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change due to its high 
exposure and low adaptive capacity (IPCC, 2014b: 1205). The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of 
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the IPCC (2014b: 1202) finds that decadal analyses of temperatures strongly point to an 
increased warming trend across the African continent over the last 50 to 100 years. In recent 
decades, North African annual and seasonal observed trends in mean near surface temperature 
indicate an overall warming that is significantly beyond the range of changes due to natural 
(internal) variability (IPCC, 2014b: 1206).  
Projections under medium emission scenarios indicate that extensive areas of Africa will exceed 
2°C warming by the last two decades of this century (relative to the late 20th century mean 
annual temperature). Under high emission scenarios, all of Africa will exceed 2oC warming 
(IPCC, 2014b). The IPCC AR5 (2014b: 1202) also found that it is likely that land temperatures 
over Africa will rise faster than the global land average, particularly in the more arid regions. For 
projected temperature extremes there is high confidence that heat waves and warm spell 
durations will increase in Africa, suggesting an increased persistence of hot days toward the end 
of the century (IPCC, 2014b: 1205). In northern Africa, there is a projected increase in the 
number of heat wave days over the 21st century (IPCC, 2014b: 1205). 
In a study commissioned by the World Bank (2014: 114) on the likely impacts of present day 
(0.8°C), 2°C and 4°C warming on agricultural production, water resources, cities and ecosystems 
across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it was projected that, geographically, the 
strongest warming in North Africa was projected to take place close to the Mediterranean coast. 
Here, but also in inland Algeria, Libya and large parts of Egypt, warming by 3°C in a 2°C world 
was projected by the end of the 21st century. In a 4°C world, mean summer temperatures are 
expected to be up to 8°C warmer in parts of Algeria by the end of the century (World Bank. 2014: 
113). By the end of the century, in a 2°C world, highly unusual (i.e. three standard deviations 
warmer than the mean temperature) heat extremes were projected to occur in about 30% of 
summer months almost everywhere in the MENA region (World Bank. 2014: 113).  
Precipitation projections 
Most areas of the African continent lack sufficient observational data to draw conclusions about 
trends in annual precipitation over the past century (IPCC, 2014b: 1207). Over the last few 
decades the northern regions of North Africa (north of the Atlas Mountains and along the 
Mediterranean coast of Algeria and Tunisia) have experienced a strong decrease in the amount 
of precipitation received in winter and early spring. However, in autumn (September-October-
November) observations show a positive trend in precipitation in some parts of northern Algeria 
and Morocco (Barkhordarian et al, 2013 cited in IPCC, 2014b: 1207).  
Precipitation projections are more uncertain than temperature projections and exhibit higher 
spatial and seasonal dependence (IPCC, 2014b: 1210). A reduction in precipitation is likely over 
Northern Africa by the end of the 21st century under the Special Report Emissions Scenarios 
(SRES) A1B and A2 scenarios2 (IPCC, 2014b: 1202). According to the review of evidence in the 
IPCC AR5 (2014b: 1210), the annual and seasonal drying/warming signal over the northern 
African region (including North of Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia) is a consistent 
                                                 
2 A1B scenario describes a future world of very rapid economic growth, global population that peaks in mid-
century and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies with a balance 
across energy sources. The A2 scenario describes a very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is self-
reliance and preservation of local identities. See Special Report on Emission Scenarios, 2000 
(https://ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/spm/sres-en.pdf) for more detailed descriptions of the A1B and A2 scenarios. 
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feature in the global and the regional climate change projections for the 21st century under the 
A1B and A2 scenarios. The AR5 highlights that estimates of possible precipitation changes in 
northern Africa vary, except for the region adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea as highlighted 
above (Link et al, 2015). Therefore, it remains unclear whether greenhouse-gas-induced climate 
warming will lead to more or less rainfall in most parts of the Sahara and Sahel.  
The World Bank (2014: 114) commissioned study Turn Down the Heat: Confronting the New 
Climate Normal, found that future northward shifts of air moisture associated with a stronger 
North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) anomaly are projected to reduce rainfall in North Africa and 
Maghreb. In a 4°C world, countries along the Mediterranean shore, notably Morocco, Algeria, 
and Egypt, are projected to receive substantially less rain. However, a projected northward shift 
of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) is expected to increase moisture delivery to the 
southern parts of the region (which are already under the influence of monsoon systems). 
Consequently, the study found that projected annual mean precipitation changes show a clear 
North-South dipole pattern, with regions north of 25°N becoming relatively drier and regions to 
the south becoming wetter (World Bank, 2014: 114). The absolute increase in precipitation in the 
southern regions, however, will be very small, because these regions are already very dry today. 
Furthermore, the effect of an increase in precipitation on water availability should be 
counteracted by a simultaneous increase in temperature, resulting in a higher rate of evaporation 
(World Bank, 2014: 114).  
Models that include atmosphere-land surface interactions indicate that there could be some 
greening in parts of the Sahel (Link et al, 2015). The near-surface atmosphere over the Sahara 
has warmed at a rate that is three times the global mean of the last 30 years. This amplified 
warming strengthened the Saharan heat low, as well as the meridional temperature and 
geopotential height gradients, which in turn leads to an increased transport of moisture into the 
Sahel, particularly eastern parts of the continent (Link et al, 2015). Climate models that predict 
the dynamics of vegetation change reveal some greening in the coming decades that extends 
into the Sahara. In some models this greening is caused by a stimulation of plant growth due to 
enhanced atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) (i.e. CO2 fertilisation). However, there are 
differences in the results of the various simulation models regarding the underlying atmospheric 
dynamics and plant processes, and the time horizons in which these occur, hence large 
uncertainties remain in these projections (Link et al, 2015: 1562). 
3. Projected impacts of climate change 
Desertification and drought 
Large parts of the North Africa region are covered with drylands, either semi-arid, arid or hyper-
arid. Drylands are dynamic and are increasingly recognised as being better understood as in a 
state of non-equilibrium (Gregory, 2017). The concept of desertification is vague, it is a complex, 
multi-layered and dynamic phenomenon that simultaneously denotes both the process of 
landscape transformation, as well as the end state of degradation in dryland ecosystems; hence 
confusion exists around the concept (see Verstraete et al. 2009 in World Bank, 2014: 136; 
Oswald and Harris, 2016: 230 –for further information on the politicisation of the term 
‘desertification’). Behnke and Mortimore (2016) argue that the concept of desertification is no 
longer useful as a distinct analytical concept as it distorts our understanding of social-
environmental systems and their resilience, but the idea of desertification has been 
institutionalised at a global level and is resilient despite the scientific evidence (see also Gregory, 
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2017). Within their book (Behnke and Mortimore, 2016), various authors contend that the 
desertification narrative confuses three different ecological processes: drought, desiccation and 
land degradation (Gregory, 2017). This has made assessing desertification globally difficult, and 
there are no comprehensive or widely accepted assessment or mitigation strategies (Oswald and 
Harris, 2016: 248; Behnke and Mortimore, 2016). Further, no study has attributed recent climate 
change as the single driver of desertification; as a result, it is difficult to quantify the role of 
climate change relative to other drivers (World Bank, 2014: 137). Drought processes are linked to 
dryland environmental change. Drought is a natural hazard caused by large-scale climatic 
variability, but it is also difficult to define due to its long onset and varying impacts depending on 
its location and duration (World Bank, 2017).  
Drought is a longstanding and recurrent challenge in North Africa (Kaniewski, Van Campo, and 
Weiss, 2012 cited in World Bank, 2017). Compared to coastal areas, North African drylands 
experience lower rainfall amounts and higher rainfall unpredictability, which may express in 
consecutive years of drought (Radhouane, 2013). The North African countries (notably Morocco, 
Algeria, and Tunisia) are consistently projected to become global hotspots for drought by the end 
of the 21st century under the Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 8.5 scenario3 (see 
Dai, 2012; Orlowsky and Seneviratne, 2013; Prudhomme et al, 2013; Sillmann et al, 2013b all 
cited in World Bank, 2014: 125). Although projections of future droughts suffer from large model 
uncertainties (and also largely depend on the methodology and baseline periods chosen), the 
projections for an increase in extreme (more severe and intense) drought conditions around the 
Mediterranean and Northern Africa are consistent across a variety of studies (see IPCC, 2012 
cited in World Bank, 2014). 
Drought can have far reaching consequences in North Africa; reduced crop output, increased fire 
hazard, increased livestock mortality, and decreased water levels are all examples of the direct 
impacts of drought (World Bank, 2017). Drought can also act as a risk multiplier, destabilising 
populations, amplifying inequalities in access to water services and water resources, and 
reinforcing perceptions of marginalisation (World Bank, 2017). Poor people are more vulnerable 
to droughts than the average member of the population (World Bank, 2017: 93).  
Water supply 
The IPCC (2014b: 1202) found that climate change will amplify existing stress on water 
availability in Africa. Water resources are subjected to high hydro-climatic variability over space 
and time, and are a key constraint on the continent’s continued economic development. MENA is 
the world’s most water-stressed region, with its countries constituting 12 of the 15 most water-
stressed countries globally (Lezzaik & Milewski, 2017). Most of the land area of the MENA region 
receives less than 300 mm annual rainfall (and 200–300 mm per year roughly represents the 
lower limit for rain-fed agriculture). Semi-arid belts along the coasts and mountains are the only 
water sources and provide productive land for rain-fed agriculture (Immerzeel et al. 2011 cited in 
World Bank, 2014: 130). The availability of renewable water resources is generally below 1000 
m3 per capita per year. Accordingly, withdrawal-to-availability ratios exceed the critical threshold 
                                                 
3 For the IPCC AR5, four RCPs were selected and defined by their total radiative forcing (cumulative measure of 
human emissions of GHGs from all sources expressed in Watts per square meter) pathway and level by 2100. 
The RCPs were chosen to represent a broad range of climate outcomes, based on a literature review, and are 
neither forecasts nor policy recommendations. See http://sedac.ipcc-
data.org/ddc/ar5_scenario_process/RCPs.html for more information. 
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of 40% in all North Africa countries (World bank, 2014: 130). This water scarcity prevents MENA 
countries from producing all required food domestically and makes the region dependant on food 
imports (World Bank, 2014). Among the serious challenges facing the North Africa region, 
freshwater scarcity ranks highest, given its impact on food security, economic development and 
poverty reduction, and socio-political stability (Lezzaik & Milewski, 2017). Natural water scarcity, 
as a function of the predominantly (hyper-)arid environment of the MENA region, is exacerbated 
by increased water demand consistent with population growth, urbanisation, and economic 
growth.  
The IPCC AR5 (2014b: 1217) highlights that a growing body of literature generated since the 
AR4 suggests that climate change in Africa will have an overall modest effect on future water 
scarcity relative to other drivers, such as population growth, urbanisation, agricultural growth, and 
land use change. However, broad-scale assumptions about drivers of future water shortages 
can mask significant sub regional variability of climate impacts, particularly in water-stressed 
regions that are projected to become drier, such as northern Africa. For North Africa, Droogers et 
al (2012 cited in IPCC, 2014b: 1217) estimated that in 2050 climate change will account for 22% 
of future water shortages in the region while 78% of increased future water shortages can be 
attributed to socioeconomic factors. Abouabdillah et al. (2010 cited in IPCC, 2014b: 1217) 
estimated that higher temperatures and declining rainfall (A2 and B1 scenarios) would reduce 
water resources in Tunisia. On the other hand, according to a World Bank study (2017: xxviii), 
socioeconomic change will drive small increases in surface water stress in countries such as 
Algeria and Tunisia. Reduced snowpack in the Atlas Mountains from a combination of warming 
and reduced precipitation, combined with more rapid springtime melting is expected to reduce 
supplies of seasonal meltwater for lowland areas of Morocco (García-Ruiz et al., 2011 cited in 
IPCC, 2014b: 1217). Overall, according to the IPCC Working Group II report (2014a and 2014b), 
there is high agreement that climate change will reduce renewable surface water and 
groundwater resources considerably in most dry-subtropical regions, aggravating competition for 
water within and among sectors. Reductions in water availability will generally be greater than 
the underlying reductions in precipitation, due to increases in potential evapotranspiration from 
warmer temperatures and non-linearity in the hydrological system (e.g. as precipitation is 
transformed into river runoff or groundwater recharge). The trend towards decreasing average 
water availability will be compounded by higher variability and more extremes, such as droughts 
and flooding, although the effects of these are not so straightforward (García-Ruiz et al, 2011; 
Törnros and Menzel, 2014 all cited in World Bank, 2014: 132).  
Groundwater in many water-scarce regions serves as a buffer for variable surface water 
availability. The buffering function of groundwater can only be maintained in the long term if there 
is a balance between recharge and withdrawal (World bank, 2014: 133). Groundwater resources 
are central to the healthy functionality of the MENA region as 76% of freshwater is primarily 
sourced from groundwater systems of which 65.6% are non-renewable fossil aquifers (Lezzaik & 
Milewski, 2017). In Algeria, 88% of the irrigated area relies on groundwater. In Morocco, better 
endowed with surface water, this figure is 42% (Kuper et al, 2017: 728). In most MENA countries, 
groundwater is severely over-extracted (World bank, 2014: 133). However, because of data 
paucity and the complexity of groundwater processes, comprehensive regional-scale 
assessments of groundwater resources in the MENA region have been lacking. Lezzaik and 
Milewski (2017) undertook an assessment of these resources using a distributed ArcGIS4 model, 
                                                 
4 A geographic information system for working with maps and geographic information. 
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finding that most of the reserves are located within large sedimentary basins in North Africa and 
the Arabian Peninsula, with Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia accounting for approximately 
75% of the region’s total freshwater reserves. As for groundwater changes between 2003 and 
2014, all MENA countries except for Morocco exhibited declines in groundwater storage. Human 
demand is a key cause of this decline. Climatic conditions were also identified as an essential 
driver of groundwater changes in the region. On the other hand, positive groundwater storage 
anomalies were observed, particularly in the southern part of the Sahara, highlighting the 
complexity and uncertainty of groundwater resources and processes (Lezzaik and Milewski, 
2017).  
Changes in the global climate are already, and are projected to continue, adding pressure on the 
profile of groundwater impacts in dryland areas, primarily through the intensification of arid 
climates and occurrence of more frequent and severe droughts resulting in a lack of moisture 
(Taylor et al, 2012). Thus, climate change will influence groundwater systems directly by 
affecting the amount of groundwater recharge, but also potentially indirectly by creating 
heightened demand for groundwater supplies (Taylor et al, 2012; IPCC, 2014a).  
Another important aspect of climate change in the region is that water availability will become 
more uncertain. Likely effects are that larger volumes of the water will arrive during shorter time 
periods, leading to changing patterns of groundwater recharge and flash floods, as well as less 
green water (soil moisture from precipitation) because arid soils are typically less able to absorb 
heavier rains (World Bank, 2017: 16). This will impair prospects for rain-fed agriculture in the 
region. Mountain areas in Morocco and Algeria also play an important role in the water supply of 
the region, as they store a fraction of precipitation as snow. With projected reduction in snowfall 
and snow water storage, peak flows of melt water will shift towards earlier months, with negative 
impacts for downstream river systems and water availability in distant regions (World Bank, 
2014: 116). As uncertainty prevails, vulnerable and marginalised groups will face the greatest 
risks, and may be more likely to face the resulting economic and health challenges (World Bank, 
2017: 16).  
Water quality 
Another important impact of climate change are changes in water quality. An increase in 
salinisation (seawater intrusion) under climate change is forecast for all water resources in the 
North African region (World Bank, 2014). The densely populated coastal areas in the region are 
most affected by climate-change-induced flooding and salinisation of deltas and aquifers, which 
is accelerated by climate-induced sea level rise (World Bank 2014, 2017). Low-lying deltas such 
as the Nile have been identified as at risk from the impacts of climate change (Tessler et al, 2015 
cited in World Bank, 2017: xxxix), as have low-lying coastal areas such as Morocco’s 
Mediterranean coastal zone (Snoussi, Ouchani, and Niazi 2008 cited in World Bank, 2017: 
xxxix). River salinisation, meanwhile, is documented in studies of the Nile. The salinisation 
process is complex, however, and climate change (while expected to compound other drivers) is 
but one important factor among others (including irrigation, water uptake and land subsidence) 
(World Bank, 2014: 116). 
Food security 
Impacts of climate change on food security depend on both production and non-production 
aspects of the food system, including not just yield effects but also changes in the amount of land 
in production and adjustments in trade patterns (IPCC, 2014a: 1077). The IPCC (2014b: 1221) 
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defines food security as being “composed of availability (is enough food produced?), access (can 
people get it, and afford it?), utilisation (how local conditions bear on people’s nutritional uptake 
from food), and stability (is the supply and access ensured?)”. Strong consensus exists that 
climate change will have a significantly negative impact on all these aspects of food security in 
Africa (IPCC, 2014b: 1221). The IPCC AR5 (2014b: 1202) also highlights evidence that climate 
change will interact with non-climate drivers and stressors to exacerbate vulnerability of 
agricultural systems, particularly in semi-arid areas.  
However, the impacts of climate change on agriculture are varied and complex, and uncertainty 
remains. Increasing temperatures and changes in precipitation are very likely to reduce cereal 
crop productivity (IPCC, 2014b). In water-limited regions, the length of the growing period is 
generally reduced if precipitation decreases while temperature and evaporative demand 
simultaneously increase. Higher rainfall variability with more intense and more frequent droughts, 
and possibly also floods, can cause more frequent crop failures. With increasing temperatures, 
several crops will exceed their temperature tolerance levels. All of these effects contribute to an 
overall reduction in crop yields (World Bank, 2014: 133). Food availability in North Africa could 
also be threatened indirectly by climate change through increased soil erosion from more 
frequent heavy storms or through increased pest and disease pressure on crops and livestock 
caused by warmer temperatures and other changes in climatic conditions (IPCC, 2014b: 1221). 
These will have strong adverse effects on food security. Increasing atmospheric CO2 
concentration, on the other hand, can decrease crop water demand and increase crop 
productivity (through the CO2 fertilisation effect – increasing photosynthesis rate for a given level 
of incoming solar radiation), although uncertainties remain on these CO2 effects (World Bank, 
2014: 133). For example, a modelling study for the World Bank by Havlik et al (2015; 17-18) 
projected that the MENA region would experience positive yield impacts due to CO2 effects, with 
crop yield increasing on average by 7.8% in the RCP8.5 scenario by 2080. However, if CO2 
effects do not materialise, overall impacts of climate change are more severe and the region 
experiences negative yield changes. 
While domestic agriculture remains a vital part of rural peoples’ livelihoods and food security in 
MENA, its contribution to meeting national demand for food staples is shrinking (Jobbins & 
Henley, 2015: 11). The MENA region strongly depends on food and associated virtual water 
imports (water embedded in the trade of agricultural commodities). About 50% of regional wheat 
and barley consumption, 40% of rice consumption, and nearly 70% of maize consumption is met 
through imports (Verner, 2012 in World Bank, 2014), and the world’s top nine wheat importers 
are MENA countries. High levels of per capita net food imports are due to severe domestic water 
(and land) constraints. Import dependency results in a high vulnerability to fluctuating global food 
prices, which to some extent are also driven by climate impacts in food-exporting regions. On the 
other hand, food imports reduce the region’s direct vulnerability to local climate risks (World 
Bank, 2014: 118). For example, Egypt meets just under half of its food needs through imports, 
growing the rest. It runs a fiscal deficit of around 10% of its GDP which makes it difficult to shield 
domestic food prices from global food price spikes: increases in world food prices contribute to 
40% of food price inflation. Higher food prices translate into greater food insecurity in Egypt, 
especially for around 13 million Egyptians who live on less than US$2 per day (Jobbins and 
Henley, 2015: 13). Jobbins and Henley (2015: 30) argue that by 2050, trends in increased 
temperature, drought, and heat extremes in MENA will intensify and inhibit crop and animal 
production, meaning food import dependency is likely to increase further. 
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Jobbins and Henley (2015: 4) highlight that although climate extremes and climate change will 
act as a risk multiplier for food insecurity in MENA (particularly around issues of water security, 
the rapid expansion of informal urban areas, and conflict and instability), the main drivers of food 
insecurity to 2030 will be population growth, urbanisation, and economic changes. Understanding 
how climate change and extremes in MENA intersect with these drivers of vulnerability and food 
insecurity will be crucial for making food systems more climate resilient and better able to meet 
changing needs (Jobbins & Henley, 2015: 4). Jobbins & Henley (2015: 5) further argue that more 
attention is needed on how climate change and variability will affect the access, stability and 
utilisation dimensions of food security in North Africa, as these are less well understood than 
climate risks to food availability (Jobbins & Henley, 2015: 5). 
4. Stability in North Africa related to climate change  
The IPCC (2014a: 758) states that “Human security will be progressively threatened as the 
climate changes. Human insecurity almost never has single causes, but instead emerges from 
the interaction of multiple factors. Climate change is an important factor threatening human 
security through (1) undermining livelihoods; (2) compromising culture and identity; (3) increasing 
migration that people would rather have avoided; and (4) challenging the ability of states to 
provide the conditions necessary for human security”. However, the evidence on the effect of 
climate change on violent conflict and human security is contested, and there is “little agreement 
about direct causality” (IPCC, 2014a: 758).   
Prosperity 
Livelihoods  
Link et al (2015: 1563) highlight that northern Africa is highly vulnerable to the consequences of 
climate change because of its strong exposure to increases in temperature, changes in 
freshwater availability, and population growth. The production of agricultural goods is sensitive to 
changing climate conditions across northern Africa, as economies strongly depend on agriculture 
or livestock. Due to the already existing water scarcity and this strong dependence on rain-fed 
agriculture, there is additional vulnerability, further exacerbated by an adaptive capacity that is 
limited by poverty and political instability. With its high and growing import dependency, the 
region is particularly vulnerable to worldwide and domestic agricultural impacts and related 
spikes in food prices (World Bank, 2014: 117). Jobbins and Henley (2015) emphasise that most 
people in MENA will be affected by climate impacts on their income and health, livelihoods, food 
price volatility, and the potential for climate extremes such as floods and storms to disrupt food 
supply chains. In urban areas, those living in densely populated informal areas with insecure 
employment and poor access to basic services will be most at risk, particularly hit hard by rising 
food prices (Jobbins and Henley, 2015: 29; World Bank, 2014: 117). The rural poor would be 
hard hit by agricultural impacts, as poor farmers in rural areas are particularly vulnerable to 
hunger and malnutrition (World Bank, 2014: 117). In North Africa, poorer populations are the 
most vulnerable to weather-related shocks (both drought and floods) (Hallegatte et al. 2016; 
Wodon et al. 2014 all cited in World Bank, 2017). The World Bank (2014: 117) emphasises that 
“while never mono-causal, such climate-related market signals may fuel the potential for social 
unrest and migration and have a lasting effect on poverty in the region”.  
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Water scarcity 
As previously discussed, while specific water security challenges vary across North Africa, their 
principal underlying driver is the scarcity of water available to meet growing and competing 
demands from diversifying economic activities (especially agriculture) and burgeoning 
populations (World Bank, 2016). The difficulties and costs of securing reliable sources of 
sufficient water are a challenge for growth and diversification of the region’s stagnant economies. 
The 2015 Global Risks Perception Survey, for example, ranked the water crisis as the most likely 
risk to MENA businesses and economies over the next 10 years, alongside unemployment and 
ahead of social instability and failures in governance (World Economic Forum, 2016 cited in 
Jobbins et al, 2016). The region is expected to have the greatest economic losses from climate 
related water scarcity as a share of GDP by 2050 (World Bank 2016). According to a study by 
the World Bank (2016) the many impacts of climate change on water scarcity have the potential 
to impair economic activities in the MENA region, causing reductions in GDP of between 6% and 
14% of GDP by 2050 (depending on the underlying economic and climate trajectories used in the 
analysis and policy scenario) (World Bank, 2016; World bank, 2017: 15). 
Migration 
Link et al (2015) highlight that in northern Africa climate change places an additional burden on 
the abundance of resources, aggravating already existing conflicts and reducing the options of 
people to successfully address these challenges to their livelihoods (Link et al, 2015). In this 
context, migration plays a vital role. Migration can be the trigger of conflict by increasing the 
pressure on resources and people in the receiving areas, thus leading to a destabilisation of 
society. On the other hand, migration can be an useful tool to prevent the onset of conflict 
because people voluntarily move to other areas to work and to send back remittances, which 
help increase prosperity and development in the originating areas (Link et al, 2015). A literature 
review carried out by the World Bank (2014: 116) argued a link between climate change and 
migration in the MENA region. As it is expected that migration options will be more limited in a 
warmer world, internal migration will continue to be important in MENA, but traditional patterns of 
mobility might be disrupted. Many people will be forced to move, while others trapped in poverty 
will be forced to stay. However, so far, research on the link between migration induced by climate 
change and environmental disasters has produced inconclusive results (Link et al, 2015). 
Vulnerability 
The IPCC (2014b: 1213) highlights that from a livelihoods perspective, African women are 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change because they shoulder an enormous but imprecisely 
recorded portion of responsibility for subsistence agriculture, the productivity of which can be 
expected to be adversely affected by climate change and overexploited soil. In northern Africa, 
even though informal or self-employment is less predominant, the gender gap is stark, with a 
much higher proportion of women compared to men in the more vulnerable informal and self-
employed status (56.7% of women compared with 34.9% of men) (UN DESA Population 
Division, 2011 cited in IPCC, 2014b: 1213). Peters and Vivekananda (2014: 21) highlight 
evidence that suggests women are more vulnerable to climate related disasters, both as victims 
of disasters and in the aftermath (with increases in domestic and sexual violence). They are 
vulnerable to climate change, both in terms of lacking opportunities to fulfil their adaptive capacity 
and by being more reliant on natural resources likely to be affected by climate change. They are 
vulnerable to conflict through lack of voice, exploitation and increased responsibility as 
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breadwinners. There are also well documented gender differences in displacement caused by 
extreme events, such as women losing their social networks or social capital (Peters and 
Vivekananda, 2014: 21). 
Otto et al (2017) reviewed recent scientific literature on social vulnerability to climate change, 
aiming to determine which social and demographic groups, across a wide range of geographical 
locations, are the most vulnerable to climate change impacts within four well-being dimensions: 
health, safety, food security, and displacement. They found that many social groups already 
exhibit high levels of vulnerability to existing climate variability. The poorest and socially 
marginalised segments of the population are the most vulnerable to climate variability and 
extremes, particularly in developing countries where the infrastructure, social safety nets and 
economic resources, needed to support vulnerable groups, are often insufficient. The evidence 
they referred to shows that intra-household differences of gender and age produce markedly 
different forms of vulnerability with women, young children and the elderly being more likely to 
suffer. Young children from disadvantaged households are especially vulnerable to slow-onset 
well-being impacts of climate extremes. This raises concerns about intergenerational climate 
justice and the risk of suffering intergenerational poverty cycles. The evidence Otto et al (2017: 
1658) presented showed that social vulnerability to climate change is shaped equally by physical 
changes in the climate system and by demographic, economic, institutional, and sociocultural 
drivers. 
Security  
Uncertainty 
There is an ongoing debate on the links between climate variability and conflict; there are a 
number of contrasting opinions, and empirical findings are mixed and often inconclusive (see 
Scheffran et al, 2012 for a detailed discussion of the debate). So far, the body of research 
attempting to establish an empirical link has failed to converge on a consistent and robust climate 
effect (Bernauer et al 2012, Adger et al 2014, Buhaug et al 2014, Salehyan 2014 all cited in 
Buhaug et al, 2015; Gemenne et al 2014). The IPCC AR5 (2014b: 1204) states that “climate 
change and climate variability have the potential to exacerbate or multiply existing threats to 
human security including food, health, and economic insecurity, all being of particular concern for 
Africa”. However, the causality between climate change and violent conflict is difficult to establish 
due to the presence of these other drivers and interconnected causes, including country-specific 
socio-political, economic, and cultural factors (IPCC, 2014b: 1204). Hence, the relationship 
between climate change and human security is not causal; the connection between climate 
change impacts and conflict outcomes is highly place and time-specific, and is the product of 
many different, intersecting factors (Abrahams and Carr, 2017: 233). 
Lewis and Lenton (2015: 385) highlight that one of the issues with discussing climate and 
security is the lack of clear definition of what is meant by the concept of security. They further 
elaborate that in a national or international sense, it refers to a state’s ability to maintain its 
interests in the global arena, but from a human perspective, this can manifest itself at a range of 
scales from global down to the individual. Security can be defined in terms of protection or 
freedom from conflict and violence, but can also refer to more complex ideas relating to human 
well-being (including concepts such as economic security, food security, environmental security, 
political security etc). In a political discourse and security analysis context, climate security often 
refers to instability or conflict, migration, or resource availability and access (Lewis and Lenton, 
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2015: 385). A framework by Scheffran et al. (2011 cited in World Bank, 2014: 144) summarises 
the climate-society interaction. Climate change puts pressure on natural resources, which in 
return can have adverse impacts for human security. Elements which make up human security 
include access to water, food, energy, transportation, health, and livelihoods, as well as 
education, lifestyle, and community. Where these aspects of human security are no longer 
guaranteed, possible consequences include societal instability (both violent and non-violent 
conflicts). 
Water scarcity 
Fragility and political instability can slow or reverse gains in water security, and water insecurity 
in turn can compound fragility (World Bank, 2017: xlii). Water scarcity in the MENA region will 
increasingly constitute a problem for the population, in particular, for those engaged in agriculture 
(World Bank, 2014: 201). The World Bank study (2014: 116) argues that climate change might 
act as a ‘threat multiplier’ for the security situation in the MENA region by placing additional 
pressure on already scarce resources and reinforcing pre-existing threats as political instability, 
poverty, and unemployment. This can create the conditions for social uprising and violent 
conflict. However, the study acknowledges that establishing a direct link between climate change 
and conflicts and insecurity is challenging due to contradictory conclusions and methods, and 
that further research is needed (Gemenne et al. 2014; see World Bank, 2014: 144 for a 
discussion of the literature).  
Drought and food security  
Previous research reporting correlational patterns between climate anomalies and violent conflict 
routinely refers to drought-induced agricultural shocks and adverse economic spill over effects as 
a key causal mechanism linking the two phenomena (Buhaug et al, 2015). During the last few 
years, violent land-use conflict in the Sahel has become the most popular example of the alleged 
link between global climate change and conflict. Benjaminsen et al (2012) explored this climate-
conflict nexus in detail, focusing on a distinct area at the heart of the Sahel, the inland delta of 
the Niger river in the Mopti region of Mali. They argue that instead of climatic factors, three 
structural factors were the main drivers behind the conflicts: agricultural encroachment that 
obstructed the mobility of herders and livestock, opportunistic behaviour of rural actors as a 
consequence of an increasing political vacuum, and corruption and rent seeking among 
government officials.  
To further empirically assess this purported indirect relationship between climate change and 
violent conflict, Buhaug et al (2015) compared half a century of statistics on climate variability, 
food production, and political violence across Sub-Saharan Africa. Their analysis revealed a 
robust link between weather patterns and food production where more rainfall generally is 
associated with higher yields. However, the second step in the causal model was not supported; 
agricultural output and violent conflict are only weakly and inconsistently connected, even in the 
specific contexts where production shocks are believed to have had particularly devastating 
social consequences. The authors highlight that although this null result could, in theory, be fully 
compatible with recent reports of food price-related riots, it suggests that the wider 
socioeconomic and political context is much more important than drought and crop failures in 
explaining violent conflict in contemporary Africa (Buhaug et al, 2015).  
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‘Threat multiplier’  
Peters and Vivekananda (2014) in their topic guide on Conflict, Climate and Environment argue 
that the policy relevance of the current academic literature on climate change and conflict is 
limited because research questions focus on establishing causality: whether or not climate 
change contributes to conflict. Without long-term multi-year research that seeks to unpack the 
role of climate, environment and natural resources in violent conflict, the evidence base which 
informs policy responses can only be considered partial. Peters and Vivekananda (2014: vii) 
further state that climate change “will continue to be a ‘risk multiplier’ of conflict, insecurity and 
fragility unless it is effectively embedded into the management of risk and building of resilience. 
[…] What determines whether (or how) climate change will lead to conflict lies in the 
‘intermediary factors’ which affect the relationship between climate and conflict”. 
Another important view is put forward by Abrahams and Carr (2017) in their review of literature 
emerging from the fields of geography and political ecology on the connections between climate 
change and conflict. They highlight that this literature uniquely challenges the dominant ‘threat 
multiplier’ framing of climate change impacts on conflict, questioning this narrative’s 
unidirectional flow from climate vulnerability to conflict, exploring how climate change can create 
opportunities for peacebuilding as well as conflict, and identifying how climate adaptation 
activities can themselves become catalysts for conflict. This is an important consideration. The 
‘threat multiplier’ discourse was popularised by the Centre for Naval Analysis (CNA) and persists 
despite the CNA more recently reframing climate change as a ‘conflict catalyst’ that accelerates 
instability (Abrahams and Carr, 2017: 236). Abrahams and Carr (2017: 236) also highlight the 
use of the Arab Spring as a commonly referenced, though contested, example of the role of 
climate change as a threat multiplier, with research linking the uprisings to increases in food 
prices due to crop failures elsewhere in the world (see Abrahams and Carr, 2017 for further 
references). 
Interlinking factors 
It is difficult to identify the impacts of climate change on stability and security in North Africa, as 
these links have not been definitively made. An international workshop held in Germany in 2014 
(Link et al, 2015) highlighted the importance of considering the drivers and interactions in the 
nexus of climate change, land use, and conflict in northern Africa in a combined manner, as there 
is no simple causal relationship from climate change to land-use change to possible conflict. 
Feedbacks need to be considered, as well as the roles of resource abundance, migration, and 
human livelihood, in the assessment of whether large-scale environmental changes lead to 
conflict or to increased cooperation (Link et al, 2015). Scheffran et al (2012) argue that 
comprehensive approaches are needed to disentangle the complex climate-conflict nexus. In 
their review of literature on the nexus, they further argue that countries with low human 
development are particularly vulnerable to the double exposure of natural disasters and armed 
conflict. This further highlights the point that climate change is not the only important parameter 
of future violence and security. Other factors such as human development, effective institutions, 
and governance also affect the likelihood of violent conflict. Economic, political, and social factors 
on local, regional and global levels are interlinked with broader effects of climate change. 
15 
5. Knowledge gaps 
A number of knowledge gaps have been identified in relation to climate change impacts in North 
Africa (although not exhaustive), especially related to migration, security and stability (Ariza and 
Rueff, 2016: 10; IPCC, 2014b: 1204): 
• Improved regional and national climate data collection and monitoring and development 
of climate change scenarios. 
• Improved analysis of existing climate and environmental data and predictions that 
incorporate complexities (global/local processes) at a national level, at medium as well as 
long term scales. 
• High levels of uncertainty for key variables and processes, including precipitation, dust 
storms, and desertification. 
• Improved drought recording; insufficient systems are in place for drought monitoring, 
given this hazard’s slow onset nature and lack of solid definition. 
• Better understanding of resilience, adaptive capacity and successful coping strategies for 
environmental degradation and climate processes at national and local levels. 
• Better understanding of the links between long-term climate change, instead of single 
climatologic hazards, to migration and social unrest. 
• Gaps in understanding of how the climate-conflict-environment nexus relates to 
vulnerabilities on multiple scales, and how these vulnerabilities might change over time.  
• Research on how climate change and variability will affect the access, stability and 
utilisation dimensions of food security in North Africa (Jobbins & Henley, 2015: 5). 
• Gaps between the type of information contained in climate projections and environment 
and security studies, with differences in the types of information produced including 
analytical methods, language, and scale issues. This makes research conclusions 
difficult to reconcile (Lewis and Lenton, 2015). 
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